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How does nationalist selfishness creep into cosmopolitan protection?

Introduction

The question of altruism versus national self-interest in international relations has been the focus of the First Great Debate in the theory of the discipline (the realist-idealist debate). In the post-cold-war era, altruistic (from the point of view of nations-states) arguments have been a central element of power politics, as military operations that might also serve national interest need a justification that refers to the needs of humanity (=security and wellbeing of all individuals regardless of borders). There is an altruistic discourse strand on the protection of civilians on a global level that plays a central role in the creation of a framing within which violent action to protect civilians finds justification in current world affairs. On the theoretical, scholarly plane of the discursive strand, we find texts by cosmopolitan scholars¹ and theorists on new wars,² who emphasise the wellbeing and security of individuals regardless of borders. Many of these scholars call for humanitarian intervention and the enforcement of humanitarian order in conflicts wherein opportunist conflict

¹ Ulrich Beck, *Cosmopolitan Vision* (Oxford: Wiley, 2006); Daniel Bray, "Pragmatic Cosmopolitanism: A Deweyan Approach to Democracy beyond the Nation-State," *Millennium-Journal of International Studies* 37, no. 3 (2009): 683–719; Chris Brown, "Cosmopolitanism, World Citizenship and Global Civil Society," *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 3, no. 1 (2000): 7–26; Jonathan Gilmore, "Protecting the Other: Considering the Process and Practice of Cosmopolitanism," *European Journal of International Relations* 20, no. 3 (September 1, 2014): 694–719; Jürgen Habermas, *The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays*, Transl. Max Pensky (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2001); Patrick Hayden, *Cosmopolitan Global Politics* (London & New York, NY: Routledge, 2005); Andrew Linklater, *The Problem of Harm in World Politics: Theoretical Investigations* (Cambridge University Press, 2011).

² Mark Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars* (New York: Zed Press, 2001); Paul Gilbert, *New Terror, New Wars*. (Edinburg: Edinburgh University Press, 2003); Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999); Siniša Malešević, "The Sociology of New Wars? Assessing the Causes and Objectives of Contemporary Violent Conflicts," *International Political Sociology* 2, no. 2 (June 1, 2008): 97–112; Patrick A. Mello, "Review Article: In Search of New Wars: The Debate about a Transformation of War," *European Journal of International Relations* 16, no. 2 (June 1, 2010): 297–309.

entrepreneurs, terrorists or autocrats use chaos to achieve selfish gains by using violence against unarmed civilians.³

On another plane, we have political texts by leaders in the US, the UK and France that oppose those conflict entrepreneurs who explicitly target civilians with their aggression using authoritarian violence, weapons of mass destruction or terror and crime:⁴ according to President Obama “We are determined to protect citizens of all nations while also upholding fundamental rights, using every legitimate tool available to combat terrorism that is consistent with our laws and principles.”⁵

In the political reality, international protection efforts have been strikingly ineffective, even counter-productive. After the first humanitarian intervention in 1999 in Serbia/Kosovo, similar interventions have taken place in eleven other cases; in seven of these under US leadership or

³ Alex J. Bellamy, “Syria Is a Failure of Commitment, Not Principle - The Washington Post,” *The Washington Post*, February 16, 2016, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2016/02/16/syria-is-a-failure-of-commitment-not-principle/>; Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane, “Toward a Drone Accountability Regime,” *Ethics & International Affairs* 29, no. 01 (March 2015): 15–37; Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars*; Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era.*, 3rd edition (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012); Mello, “Review Article”; Herfried Münkler, *The New Wars.* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002); Ramesh Thakur, “The Responsibility to Protect at 15,” *International Affairs* 92, no. 2 (March 2016): 415–34.

⁴ Tony Blair, “Prime Minister Outlines Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi People. Comments Made Following a Joint UK, US and Spain Summit, The Azores, 16 March.,” March 16, 2003; George W. Bush, “President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East,” (Office of the White House Press Secretary, remarks by the President at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, November 6, 2003), <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html>; David Cameron, “PM’s Speech at London Conference on Libya. Given at Lancaster House, London, 29 March. Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-speech-at-london-conference-on-libya> (Accessed 13 March 2017).,” March 29, 2011; Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Libya. Washington, DC: National Defense University, 28 March. Available at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/28/remarks-president-address-nation-libya> (Accessed 14 June 2011).,” 2011; Nicholas Sarkozy, “Statement by the President of the Republic at the Paris Summit for the Support of the Libyan People. 19 March. Available at: <http://fr.ambafrance-us.org/Spip.php?Article2241> (Accessed 14 June 2011).,” 2011.

⁵ Barack Obama, “Statement on the European Union-United States Agreement on the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program July 8, 2010,” in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 2010, Book 2.* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2011), 1044.

crucial involvement.⁶ In these interventions in countries that are unwilling or unable to protect their citizens from violence, intervention against tyrants, criminal conflict entrepreneurs or terrorists has explicitly been justified by references to the need to protect innocent civilians, even though this altruistic rationale has not necessarily been the (only) motive for intervention. Some of these interventions have formally been seen as humanitarian interventions or operations born of the responsibility to protect, and some have not. In all but one case, that of Sierra Leone, either the state has weakened or collapsed, or the number of fatalities has radically increased after the “protective” involvement has ensued, or both. Furthermore, conflicts tend to last longer once outside intervention occurs.⁷

One of the reasons for this is that despite rhetoric justifying intervention for the purpose of protection of civilians, many of the domestic justifications for “protective” military action are in reality related to selfish national interest rather than altruistic cosmopolitanism. As Falk suggests humanitarian moves by states are often underfunded while interventions backed by sufficient

⁶ Military operations are considered protective if they are a) carried out in fragile countries (the list of fragile states is derived from Marshall & Cole, 2014, by removing elements that would lead to tautological arguments when the relationship between fragility and conflict is studied, see Timo Kivimäki, *Failure to Protect. The Fatal Consequences of Military Humanitarian Intervention in Conflict*. (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, Forthcoming)., b) they are actual war (rather than peace-keeping) operations that are listed in the Uppsala conflict data Marie Allansson, Erik Melander, and Lotta Themner, “Organized Violence, 1989-2016.,” *Journal of Peace Research* 54, no. 4 (2017): 536–550. as internationalized intra-state conflicts or they are listed as civil conflicts, but they are interfered by sustained (at least three) aerial operations of outside powers (these the Uppsala data does not code as war participation). The cases are presented in Kivimäki, *Failure to Protect. The Fatal Consequences of Military Humanitarian Intervention in Conflict*., chap. 2., and they include Kosovo 1999, Sierra Leone 2000, Afghanistan 2001-, Iraq 2003-2011, 2014-, Pakistan 2004-, Central African Republic 2006, Somalia 2007-, Yemen 2010-, Mali 2000, Libya 2011, Mauretania 2012-13 and Syria 2014-. The US was not centrally involved in the British operation in Sierra Leone (2000) or the French operations in the Central African Republic 2006, Mali 2000, and Mauretania 2012-13.

⁷ Kivimäki, *Failure to Protect. The Fatal Consequences of Military Humanitarian Intervention in Conflict*., Chapter 4.

resources tend to be strategic in motivation, and humanitarian only in rationalization.⁸ Thus, altruistic cosmopolitan justifications often help legitimize nationally self-interested operations, and this leads into greater suffering. This is the development that this article focuses on: How does, what Falk describes, happen empirically? Thus, this article investigates how selfish justifications enter cosmopolitan rationales in the political plane of the discourse. It makes sense of the ways in which selfish ideas can meddle in and merge with morally-based cosmopolitan norms.

Existing literature

Classical realist theories have emphasized the primacy of national interest in international relations as something of a natural reality: “Each state is responsible for its own survival and is free to define its own interests and to pursue power.”⁹ Due to the centrality of states in the organization of the world, moralism in which states try to intervene in the way other states rule their citizens is dangerous to the stability of world order.¹⁰ Furthermore, realist thinking often sees national self-interest as a natural state of world affairs: self-interested behaviour is not only prescribed to states, it is also expected of them.¹¹ From the realist perspective, then, the study of how nationalist selfishness enters the calculation of foreign relations is not an interesting one: self-interest is in the calculations as a default/natural state of affairs.

Even the more structural, neorealist perspectives of international relations theory reject moralism that crosses borders and prescribes protection of citizens of other nations. Neorealists also share the assumption that the international system does not yet have effective rules that could regulate

⁸ Richard Falk, “‘Humanitarian Wars’, Realist Geopolitics and Genocidal Practices: ‘Saving Kosovars,’” in *In Ken Booth, Ed., The Kosovo Tragedy. The Human Rights Dimension.*, 2nd edition (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 325–34.

⁹ W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz, “Political Realism in International Relations,” in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Summer 2017 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2017), 2, <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/realism-intl-relations/>.

¹⁰ Henry Kissinger, *World Order* (London: Penguin, 2014).

¹¹ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace.*, 7th ed., vol. Revised by Kenneth W. Thompson & W. David Clinton (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006).

interference of nations into each other's internal affairs.¹² Instead, anarchy is still seen by all realists as the basic characteristic of relations between states.

Constructivist critics of realist thinking tend to emphasize the openness of social futures and the participation of shared epistemic approaches in the creation of our world political realities. Even if states behave selfishly, this does not mean that selfish behaviour is the only option available to them.¹³ If that were the case, morality and norms would be impossible to incorporate into the conceptualization of world politics. Yet, it is clear that norms affect the international society and that they must be included in our investigation, as suggested by the English school in critique of American realism.¹⁴ The very fact that most major military operations have been made politically possible by means of cosmopolitan justifications speaks to this reality.

In addition to emphasizing the possibility of cosmopolitan agendas, cosmopolitan scholars often point out, in their critique of realism, that world politics is, indeed, observably moving in a more cosmopolitan direction.¹⁵ On the one hand cosmopolitan moralism is progressing:

1. Individual rights of "global citizens" are being focused on more than the rights of states.
2. All human beings, universally, are seen to possess the same moral status (rather than this status being affected by state borders).

¹² Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley Publishing Company, 1979).

¹³ Richard Ned Lebow, *Forbidden Fruit: Counterfactuals and International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).

¹⁴ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).

¹⁵ Mary Kaldor, *Global Civil Society: An Answer to War*. (Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 2003); Nicholas J. Wheeler, *Saving Strangers. Humanitarian Intervention in International Society*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Jürgen Habermas, "Bestialität Und Humanität," in Reinhard Merkel Ed., *Der Kosovo Krieg Un Das Völkerecht*. (Frankfurt Am Main: Suhrkamp, 2000), 51–65; Thakur, "The Responsibility to Protect at 15."

3. Persons are subject of concern for everyone generally (rather than my obligations were limited to the borders of my state).¹⁶

Individualism (with regards to rights), universalism and generality can be considered as the moral premises of cosmopolitan thinking, and it can be claimed that these premises have gained prominence in world politics. Concept of human security has emerged in complementation of the concept of state security,¹⁷ the international agenda of securing states has been directed to complemented by activities to protect civilians wherever they reside,¹⁸ and there are already international institutions that focus on global norms that oblige and safeguard people irrespective of their nationality.¹⁹

This cosmopolitanization of security is part of a logical historical process as the long-term development is towards an expansion of zones of order. While primitive societies defended themselves in families against other families and then in clans and tribes against other clans and tribes, more developed societies organized their security and order in city-states and eventually in nation-states.²⁰ There is, therefore, no reason to regard state-centred selfishness in world politics as

¹⁶ Hayden, *Cosmopolitan Global Politics*, 3; see also Gillian Brick, *Global Justice. A Cosmopolitan Account*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Simon Caney, *Justice Beyond Borders. A Global Political Theory*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Allen Buchanan, *Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination. Moral Foundations for International Law*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Lee Jones, "Sovereignty, Intervention, and Social Order in Revolutionary Times," *Review of International Studies* FirstView (2013): 1–19; Immanuel Kant, "Toward Perpetual Peace," in *In Practical Philosophy – Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Gregor MJ (Trans.)*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

¹⁷ Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now: Final Report* (New York: Commission on Human Security, 2003); United Nations Development Program, *Human Development Report 1994. New Dimensions of Human Security* (New York, NY: UNDP, 1994).

¹⁸ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, "Responsibility to Protect Report," Council on Foreign Relations, 2005, <http://www.cfr.org/humanitarian-intervention/international-commission-intervention-state-sovereignty-responsibility-protect-report/p24228>.

¹⁹ International Criminal Court, "Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court" (United Nations, July 17, 1998), http://legal.un.org/icc/statute/99_corr/cstatute.htm.

²⁰ Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process. Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations*. (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1939); Francis Fukuyama, *The Origins of Political Order From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution* (New York: MacMillan, Farrar, Straus and Giroux

“natural”; the primacy of national interest is simply a stage that can be superseded. Thus, according to this type of cosmopolitanism, the global concern for human security and human wellbeing, across state borders, is not just a moral prescription, but also a progressive movement that continues the historical process of expansion of communities of security governance. This movement has been responsible for the civilization of people and the decline of violent deaths in the world.²¹

From these normative and ontological premises most cosmopolitan scholars and especially scholars of new wars prescribe that the international community has an obligation to respond to challenges in which fragile states offer opportunities for violent individuals, groups or governments to exploit civilians within their territories.²² Yet, this is not shared by all cosmopolitan scholars. Vincent, who is one of the first powerful advocates of individualistic, universal and general human rights, still holds that the respect for sovereignty is a necessary element of the functioning international system, while Falk is worried about the mixing of cosmopolitan and self-interested motives.²³ Yet, for the sake of simplicity, in this article the prescription of cosmopolitan protection, will be associated with the cosmopolitan discourse.

In this article the discourse strand on national selfishness uses the above definition of the realist national self-interest and the focus on the rights and interests of states. The reconstruction of the cosmopolitan discourse that will be studied as an international justification of Western interventions, uses the above definition of the ethical individualism, universalism and generality as

Paperbacks, 2011); Kaldor, *New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era.*, 2012; Steven Pinker, *The Better Angels of Our Nature. The Decline of Violence in History and Its Causes.* (London: Allen Lane/Penguin, 2011).

²¹ Elias, *The Civilizing Process. Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations.*; Pinker, *The Better Angels of Our Nature. The Decline of Violence in History and Its Causes.*

²² Bellamy, “Syria Is a Failure of Commitment, Not Principle - The Washington Post”; Buchanan and Keohane, “Toward a Drone Accountability Regime”; Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars*; Kaldor, *New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era.*, 2012; Mello, “Review Article”; Münkler, *The New Wars.*; Thakur, “The Responsibility to Protect at 15.”

²³ R. J. Vincent, *Nonintervention and International Order* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974); Falk, “‘Humanitarian Wars’, Realist Geopolitics and Genocidal Practices: ‘Saving Kosovars.’”

well as the ontological optimism of expanding zones of order. Most importantly, though, this article uses the cosmopolitan prescription of international protection of people regardless of borders, even though most cosmopolitan moralists do not claim it to be possible, while some cosmopolitan theorists of international relations explicitly claim it to be counter-productive.

The assumption behind the motivation of this article is that a pure realist logic in world politics would not have justified conflicts in faraway places, conflicts that have little to do with the security of the states that ended up intervening in these conflicts. The assumption is, given that these interventions have escalated conflicts and made their target countries more fragile and thus less able to control violence, that the world would have been better off with pure realist thinking than with the mixes cosmopolitan and realist thinking. The other assumption behind the motive of this article is that a pure cosmopolitan mentality in the world would have allowed greater resourcing of protection of civilians, the build-up of genuine cosmopolitan agency for it and the allowing of agency for the protected people in the activity of protection. This could have served the world better, and it could have led the world to a global security community, something that the mixing of cosmopolitan and self-interested approaches failed to do.

Data and methods

This article assumes open futures (and genuine agency) and acknowledges the social constitution of the social reality in which we live, but still it takes intersubjective evidence seriously. Instead of using causal models, it reconstructs discursive processes, but tackles discourse analysis in an empirically responsible manner. According to Kivimäki,²⁴ protection has failed to reduce violence and state fragility, and this must be partly related to the fact that cosmopolitan justifications that

²⁴ Kivimäki, *Failure to Protect. The Fatal Consequences of Military Humanitarian Intervention in Conflict*; see also Donald M. Snow, *The Case against Military Intervention: Why We Do It and Why It Fails*. (New York and London: Routledge, 2016); David Chandler, *From Kosovo to Kabul*. (London & Sterling, Virginia: Pluto Press, 2002).

make interventions possible in the international society have been entangled by selfish, “realist” national justifications.

This study starts with the idea of treating text as data.²⁵ This does not mean that texts that describe realities outside the text (such as one’s own commitment to a cause, one’s willingness to sacrifice, etc) as a true description of the world. Instead, as the focus is on logics that constitute legitimate political agency and action – causes that nations can mobilize allies to participate or citizens to sacrifice their lives to – we are looking at texts that constitute social realities rather than describing them. If the president of the United States criticizes the use of chemical weapons against civilians by the government of Syria, he articulates a reality in which at least he himself does not have an option to use chemical weapons against civilians without additional political costs. The speech act of the president also creates an identity for the US that is dissociated from the identity of actors that gas civilians. Similarly, when the president of the United States makes a distinction between operations that only target civilians (terrorism) and those that target military targets, his speech constitutes a reality within which at least the United States has to live in, of terrorism as a particularly repulsive political strategy and terrorists as an identity dissociated from the identity of the US.²⁶ This way texts are and constitute the reality this article is studying, and thus they can be treated as evidence, even if they might be deceptive in their description of the reality outside the text.

Due to the central role of the United States in military operations to protect global civilians, and due to the central role of the United States president in American foreign policy, I have selected the US

²⁵ John Wilkerson and Andreu Casas, “Large-Scale Computerized Text Analysis in Political Science: Opportunities and Challenges,” *Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.* 2017. 20:529–44 20 (2017): 529–44.

²⁶ Ronald R. Krebs, *Narrative and the Making of US National Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Lene Hansen, *Security As Practice: Discourse Analysis And The Bosnian War* (London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2006).

government *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States*²⁷ as my primary data for discourse analysis. I have studied the entire period of the emergence of the discourse strand on protection starting from the last days of the cold war until the last published electronic versions of the compilation of the presidential papers (1989-2012),²⁸ almost 30 million words.

Studying the entire post-cold war period of the development of the discourse strand on protection requires methodological compromises: not all cases of intervention are similar, not all countries are similar, not all sentences justifying interventions are similar and not all the speakers of interventions (presidents) are similar. Thus, generalizing all protective interventions, generalizing all self-interested clauses and all cosmopolitan clauses, etc. loses a lot of detail and nuances. Furthermore, if text is considered evidence, then we cannot claim, by referring to this evidence, anything that we would like to, on the basis of our understanding of the historical context or on our understanding of the cultural context of policies. Interpretations can be developed on the basis historical or cultural contextual interpretations but they have to be tested against the texts, and this may rule out something a purely qualitative content analysis could reveal. Yet, the literature on cosmopolitan protection is full of selective studied that select sentences and cases that fit into their authors' own argument. Such a strategy of research manages to keep track of important nuances and details. However, the intention here is to complement these existing studies with an approach that looks at the whole discursive development and makes no selections that cannot be transparently shown. Looking at all clauses with the word "protect", in the entire period of the post-Cold War development of the discourse on protection makes the evidence more transparent and, thus, adds credibility to the findings. Given the already existing literature on specific cases, specific sentences, and specific nuances and details, there is space for an article that takes a more general look at the

²⁷ US Government Printing Office, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States*. (Washington D.C.: US Governemnt Printing Office, various years).

²⁸ Year 2012 is, at the time of writing of this article, the latest year for which the USGPO compilation of presidential papers is available in NVivo compatible format.

regularities in the development of the discourse on protection. Using this approach, I will substantiate my claims on discourses in a more transparent, rigorous and hopefully convincing manner than by simply selecting sentences from various sources or interpretations that refer to historical or cultural contexts whose selection I cannot transparently reveal.

Since this article does not treat texts as something that describes reality as their authors see it, this study is committed to a different ontology and thus a different method than most computerized textual analyses. It is based on the idea that world politics is not dictated by exogenous, material realities. Instead, even the material reality becomes meaningful only through discourses. Thus, my research on the social realities of protection will have to start from the discourses that are, on the one hand, a product of human activity, but which also facilitate and constrain the imagination and opportunities of human agency. The interaction between agency, social realities and material realities cannot be revealed by a causal analysis that seeks explanations of developments based on exogenous material causes, nor can it be revealed by an analysis that does not recognize the importance of interpretations and discourses as social reality. Thus, such an analysis needs to look at meanings revealed in the texts. It must examine their relation to material, non-discursive events and structures as well as to purposive agency.

To make sense of frameworks that legitimize and justify killing in a military operation for an audience, one needs to analyse the texts that the actor presents to this audience. In this way, one can understand the ontological and normative foundations and the ways in which these foundations are mobilized and associated with projects such as military intervention. One needs dispositive analysis to reveal the knowledge behind the actions and practices of cosmopolitan protection.²⁹ However, when investigating apparently conflicting discourses, as is the case when one looks, on the one hand, at protection which tends to kill the ones it intends to protect, and on the other, at how selfish

²⁹ Michael Foucault, *The Archeology of Knowledge*. (London: Tavistock Publications, 1974).

interests enter into altruistic discourse strands on protection, one will probably not find a coherent set of texts within which all these contradictions make sense. Instead, one needs to analyse the historically specific processes in which the discourse strands of different issue areas entangle and where compromises are needed and made within systems of decision-making, where dramatic events affect interpretation, and where different audiences can then be convinced by references to different types of normative and ontological premises.³⁰

We need to study the specific histories of interaction between action and social structures, in which actions are constituted by existing social structures and social structures are constituted by interpretative actions.³¹ If we look at ideational constructs such as humanitarian norms, as well as human, group or national and international pursuits to rescue civilians anywhere in the world, we can see that these discourses and pursuits were born and they developed and created the institutions that they needed to succeed through specific historical processes. In these processes, social and material realities enabled and obstructed, directed and focused purposes and norms of civilian protection. Other norms and structures that political norms created affected the path from ideas to outcomes. Studying this path will require “discursive process tracing,”³² in which the focus is on texts that reflect and create discursive events, such as changing types of arguments, norms and interpretations, rather than merely material events. These events naturally interact with changes in

³⁰ Siegfried Jäger, “Discourse and Knowledge: Theoretical and Methodological Aspects of a Critical Discourse and Dispositive Analysis,” in *Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, Eds., Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis* (London: Sage, 2001), 32–62; Michael Meyer, “Between Theory, Method and Politics. Positioning of Approaches to CDA,” in *Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, Eds., Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis* (London: Sage, 2001), 1–20; Ruth Wodak, “A Discourse-Historical Approach,” in *Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, Eds., Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis* (London: Sage, 2001), 63–94.

³¹ Alexander Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” *International Organization* 41, no. 3 (July 1, 1987): 335–70.

³² Krebs talks about narratives and process tracing in his article that tries to explain what makes a discourse successful and hegemonic. His method is relatively similar to my discursive process tracing except for the fact that Krebs uses content analysis of texts as his source of evidence, while my process tracing seeks greater transparency for my generalizations by means of computer-assisted word frequency and relational frequency analysis.

material realities, and this interaction is well documented in texts related to political strategies on protection of civilians.

When tracing the processes of discourse development there are junctures at which deviations to the cosmopolitan justification behind a policy enter the scene. Such junctures could be found:

- a. Within the internal logic of the discourse strand that deals with protection of civilians: how certain types of arguments are allowed while others are not, depending on the normative and ontological premises of the discourse and pre-agreed-upon premises for argumentation on which the discourse strand is based. This part of the analysis uses the lessons of so-called dispositive analysis, aimed at reconstructing and revealing the knowledge about identities (including oneself), relationships and structures lying behind discursive and non-discursive practices and reconstructing non-discursive practices which have led to the manifestations/materializations and the knowledge contained therein.³³
- b. In the entanglements of discourse strands³⁴ on protection and other interrelated issues. These entanglements are meaningful for the development of the normative and ontological premises of the discursive strand of protection. How, for example, the discourse strand on victimhood is used to depoliticize protection in the entanglements that expose discussion on protection to the ontologies and ethics of debates on victimhood (or criminality, or security threats, or democracy) affects the way in which the ownership of protection is shared.

³³ Joannah Caborn, "On the Methodology of Dispositive Analysis," *Critical Approaches to Discourse Analysis Across Disciplines 1 (1)*: 1, no. 1 (2007): 115–23; MICHAEL Foucault, *The Order of Things* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994); Ronald R. Krebs, "How Dominant Narratives Rise and Fall: Military Conflict, Politics, and the Cold War Consensus," *International Organization FirstView* (June 2015): 1–37, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818315000181>; Krebs, *Narrative and the Making of US National Security*.

³⁴ Jäger, "Discourse and Knowledge: Theoretical and Methodological Aspects of a Critical Discourse and Dispositive Analysis.," 47–48; Siegfried Jäger and Florentine Maier, "Analysing Discourses and Dispositives: A Foucauldian Approach to Theory and Methodology," in *Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, Eds., Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis* (London: Sage, 2001), 122–23.

c. In the interaction of the text with audiences as part of the discourse context of protection.³⁵

It is clear that especially domestic and international audiences, rural national voters vs. international diplomats have very different ethical and ontological expectations of the US president. Thus, texts produced for these two audiences affect the development of the discourse strand. The requirements imposed on the president or another decision-maker in US foreign politics based on a situation presented to a domestic or international audience affects US policy in varying ways, since consistency in the statements and knowledge revealed in texts and actions is necessary for credibility. Sometimes, interpretations of the realities of world politics are created to solve problems created by the need for consistency. US presidents, for example, tend to favour worldviews in which national interests can be reconciled with international responsibilities, and sometimes the need for consistency pushes them towards interpretations that are not optimal in terms of credibility, or ones that can only be sustained by hiding the evidence against them.

d. In the interaction of the discourse with the institutional settings to which they belong. The question of differing audiences is closely linked with the question of the structure of decision-making.³⁶ The president primarily needs to persuade Congress to get funding for foreign operations, and the nation's voters to keep the mandate and decision-making power on foreign operations. When the knowledge behind domestic and international audiences clashes it is understandable that compromises need to be made, primarily at the expense of global ontologies and ethics.

e. In events and discourse histories.³⁷ Crises in Rwanda, Somalia and Bosnia are often mentioned as the most important historical discourse contexts that affect the development of a

³⁵ Jäger, "Discourse and Knowledge: Theoretical and Methodological Aspects of a Critical Discourse and Dispositive Analysis.," 48; Thierry Balzacq, *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve* (Taylor & Francis, 2010); J. Renkema, *Introduction to Discourse Studies* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing, 2004), 207.

³⁶ Rene von Schomberg and Kenneth Baynes, *Discourse and Democracy: Essays on Habermas's Between Facts and Norms* (SUNY Press, 2002), 37.

³⁷ Meyer, "Between Theory, Method and Politics. Positioning of Approaches to CDA."

discourse strand. The globalist ontologies of the immediate post-cold war period were difficult to reconcile with the well-published events in Mogadishu in March 1993, when 18 US soldiers were killed. At the same time the experienced consequences of the failure to react forcefully in Bosnia and Rwanda have served to boost interventionist arguments.

Despite dealing with interpretative reality and social constructs, in my investigation I have refused to make a random selection of what is important or to put forth loose claims of the representative quality of particular constructs. Instead, I have mapped discursive developments using computer-assisted textual analysis. For this I have used the NVivo text analysis program.

First, I selected proxy words for different discourse strands and used word frequency analyses to reveal how different discourse strands are related to each other and how this relationship develops. I have looked at the association between word frequencies of words “protect”, “humanitarian”, “innocent”, “victim”, “threat”, “civilian”, “revenge”, “terror” and “crime” in order to investigate discursive entanglements.

Second, I coded clauses that deal with protection (selecting them by searching for the word “protect” in its different forms) for the types of threats against which protection is needed. First, I ruled out instances covering protection of Americans and US institutions against non-external (for example, protection of American children against crime, decadence or tobacco and the like.),³⁸ non-life-threatening threats (protection of US tobacco farmers, economic protectionism, etc.) and unintentional threats to the US and Americans (pandemics, securing of international traffic against technical dangers). Somehow the above-mentioned threats are not related to the discourse strands of foreign policy and security. Any other threats have been included in my further analysis. Since the environmental threats have a special place in foreign and security policies I have coded the

³⁸ Since the threat of terrorism in US discourse is clearly externalized, even when the perpetrators are US citizens, I ruled all terrorist threats as external despite the fact that in the 1990s these were often seen as criminal threats rather than international political conspiratorial threats.

environment as a separate referent object of protection without making an artificial distinction between domestic and international (after all, environmental problems do not recognize state borders). I have considered them when making calculations on the associations between various discourses.

The next phase of relational textual analysis focuses on the referent object of protection: that is, who is being protected. I have done this technically by looking at the grammatical object of the word “protect”. In some cases, though, the referent object of protection needs to be followed further in the paragraph and the speech/letter/interview. In this way, all clauses with the word “protect” were included in this relational coding, which classified the referent objects into four categories: 1. Protection of the US state and its people and institutions from intentional external danger, 2. Protection of allies from comparable danger, Protection of the environment, and 4. Protection crucial to the survival and wellbeing of people and institutions in states outside the US alliance, from internal and external, intentional and non-intentional threats (that is to say, genuine cosmopolitan protection; such as protection of citizens in developing countries from terror, dictators and criminals, but also from developmental problems).³⁹

In order to be sure of the unambiguity of my coding rules I have had four students who have replicated parts of my coding so that I was able to verify that the same sentences always get the same coding.⁴⁰ For the sake of transparency and to allow the replication and further development and use of my data the coding on NVivo of the presidential papers and the quantitative data on word and relational frequencies are openly available in NVivo, Stata formats respectively, from the

³⁹ I classified the protection of terrorists by rogue states in the category of protection that I have ruled out in the beginning to maintain the normative relevance of this category of protection.

⁴⁰ For help with the development of the nodes and testing the unambiguity of the coding rules, I am grateful to Riccardo Boscherini, Thomas Brewis, Maddy Holley and Astrid Vikström,

replication data depository of the University of Bath, Research Data Archive at <http://doi.org/10.15125/12345>.

In an investigation of how different discourse strands relate to one another, and how the primacy of a cosmopolitan referent object develops, it is not only possible to map mega developments in the discourse strand on protection and thus show what is hegemonic and what is not hegemonic in the discourse. It is also possible to identify periods when something worthy of qualitative analysis occurs in the discourse strand on protection. Thus, the main qualitative analysis reaching deeper into the meanings in the texts can be based on something more than my own subjective understandings.

National and cosmopolitan justifications for humanitarian military interventions

To get a first glimpse of the extent to which protection of civilians is related to selfish national interests, it will be possible to correlate the frequencies of different words that relate to the protection discourse strand, humanitarian discourse strand and national security discourse strand. This could be a rough beginning to an analysis of the origins of the political protection discourse strand.

The word “humanitarian” and the word “civilian” seem to be words that are related to the human security debate and humanitarian discourse strand. Their frequencies (number of occurrences divided by the number of occurrences of all words) are very significantly correlated (.381**, $p=.008$, $n=47$).⁴¹ Surprisingly, however, the standardized relative frequency of “protection” is not associated with the frequency of humanitarian words, such as “humanitarian” and “civilian”. There is an insignificant correlation between word frequencies of the words “protect” and “civilian” (.162,

⁴¹ When looking at word frequencies, I look at each word and at words that stem from them (protect, protected, protection etc.). Most of the variations focused upon in word frequency analyses here are not normal (Gaussian), and thus all the correlations of word frequencies referred to here are non-parametric correlations (Spearman). Frequencies are adjusted to the biannual data from the Public Papers of the Presidents.

$p=.276$, $n=47$) but a greater, yet still insignificant, negative correlation ($-.184$, $p=.216$, $n=47$) is found between the frequency of words “humanitarian” and “protect.” So whenever one of the discourse strands is central to the presidential debate, the other is not more central.

However, the word “innocent” is moderately strongly, and statistically very significantly, associated with “protection” ($.624^{**}$, $p\sim.0000$, $n=47$). While there is a significant victimhood discourse in the US post-911 political debate, the word victim is hardly ever used with reference to the United States as a victim. Instead the innocence of American victims of terrorist violence was used to justify American response against terrorists. Victims in presidential speeches, at the same time, are almost always peoples from fragile developing countries. US victimhood on 11 September 2001 was treated as a declaration of war and the innocence of Americans on 11 September 2001 activated the US response.

The word “innocent” is used to articulate an ontology in which conflicts are between innocent people and predatory enemies. This ontology is important for the justification of military operations, and thus, the word “innocent” is also very significantly associated with the justification of ongoing military operations (but less so with new operations). The number of existing US military operations is moderately correlated in a statistically significant manner with the frequency of the word “innocent” ($.447^{*}$, $p=.0016$, $n=47$). The fact that the more humanitarian word “victim” is not significantly associated with protection discourse, and that it is negatively associated with existing US operations ($-.395^{*}$, $p=.006$, $n=47$), suggests that the conclusion of the discourse strand on innocence involves the articulation of a black and white reality with good guys and bad guys, rather than it being a sign of an association between the discourse strand on protection and that on humanitarianism and cosmopolitanism. The strength of the negative correlation between existing operations and the frequency of the word “victim” is also naturally related to the hesitation of any administration to reveal victimhood (ones own or the enemy’s) in relation to existing military operations.

It seems that there is no significant correlation between the launching of military operations and the frequency of the word “humanitarian” or the word “civilian” in presidential papers.⁴² Thus it seems clear that the humanitarian discourse strand does not have a strong association with the decision to launch a military operation to protect civilians in a far-away country.

The frequency of “civilian” and “humanitarian” are not very significantly correlated with the number of existing military operations either, even though the correlation there is more significance than in the case of new operations. In the case of the word “civilian”, the correlation is significantly positive, while for “humanitarian” it is significantly negative (“humanitarian: -.312, $p=.033$, $n=47$; “civilian”: .335*, $p=.021$, $n=47$). Thus, if there are any cosmopolitan considerations related to US protective operations, they seem to relate to the continuation, that is, *ex post* justification and declarations for specific audiences.


However, the frequency of “protection” is strongly associated with the frequencies of word “threat” from a more militaristic, selfish and security-based threat discourse strand. The correlations between the two relative (per mil) frequencies is 0.701^{**} ($p\sim.0000$, $n=47$). Thus, clearly, the protection discourse strand seems closely linked to the threat discourse strand. This, in turn, is often selfish and nationalist and bases social realities on security issues rather than focusing on building order.

The entanglement between protection and the militarized threat discourse strand becomes especially strong once the cosmopolitan protection debate begins to justify military operations, in particular since 1999. From 1999 until 2012, only once did the frequency of the words "protect" and "threat" not move in the same direction in a year-to-year comparison. The year in question was 2001, where

⁴² When talking about protective operations, I refer to the eight operations in which the US participated, as listed in the introduction. Since political acceptance is only required for starting an operation, and not for individual strikes, I code the start of an operation in a country as one start. When talking about ongoing operations, I code an operation as ongoing if military action continues during the time period of the document collection in question. Thus, each country operation is counted only once, regardless of the number of airstrikes or other operations that year.

the frequency of "protection" decreased while the frequency of the word "threat" increased. Years when the frequency of "threat" rose more (or declined less) than the frequency of the word "protect" were 1999, 2001, 2004, and 2011, all years for new American protective operations (Kosovo, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Libya). Years when the frequency of "protection" rose more than the frequency of "threat" were 1992, 1995, 1996 (threat declined), in the vicinity of times when many opportunities for humanitarian protection existed in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia, but the US opted against. Furthermore, Graph 1 shows the bi/tri-annual development of word frequencies and suggests that the entanglement between the two discourses is of the nature where threat speech changes first and is then followed by protection speech. The rise of threat speech happened instantly after 11 September 2001, while the rise of protection speech followed six months later. Again in 2003, threat speech was prevalent at the beginning of the year, when the operation in Iraq was discussed, and protection speech followed only somewhat later. Thus, it seems that threat rather than the need to protect justifies military operations.

Graph 1:



The launching of protective operations and the number of ongoing protective operations have moderate, significant and highly significant positive non-parametric correlations respectively with the relative (per mil) frequency of the word "threat" in the biannual analysis of presidential papers

(launching of new operations .315*, $p=0.031$, $n=47$, and ongoing operations, .408**, $p=0.004$, $n=47$). The word “military” has an even higher correlation with the launching of new operations, while it has a lower correlation with ongoing operations (launching of new operations .348*, $p=0.017$, $n=47$, and ongoing operations, .384**, $p=0.008$, $n=47$). This, too, suggests that while threat speech and protection speech are strongly entangled, it is the threat speech that is more related to the decision to enter a new military operation, while protection speech is more related to the *ex post* justification of existing operations. The frequency of “protect” shows no significant correlation with new or ongoing operations. Thus, the operations that are officially, internationally justified as operations for the protection of civilians are related to the security-based discourse on threats and military, rather than the cosmopolitan discourse strand on “humanitarian” or “protection”.

If we then look at the referent object of protection in presidential papers, we can see that while the share of the cosmopolitan referent object of protection is not associated with new or ongoing protective military operations, the share of the national referent object (the frequency with which US security is mentioned as the object of protection as a percentage of the frequency of all objects of protection) is very significantly, and strongly associated with the number of ongoing protective military operations (.632*, $p\sim.0000$, $n=49$). Thus, it seems, there is a much stronger association between national values to be protected and the willingness to engage in protective interventions in faraway countries. While in the international fora the United States gives cosmopolitan rationales, the main priority in presidential discourse for protection is national. Thus, the protection frame and the actions which it is used to justify are closely connected to threats and the need to protect the United States rather than the countries where protection takes place.

Thus, it seems likely that the political discourse strand on cosmopolitan protection of global civilians as well as operations that are assumed to be justified by cosmopolitan spirit, are influenced by nationalist concerns. Global civilians are part of the international justification rather than being

an important part of the real justification and motive of interventions. This discovery lends support to Falk's claim that protective interventions are strategic in motivation, and humanitarian only in rationalization.⁴³

How do the realist and hegemonic fallacies contaminate the cosmopolitan cause?

When trying to understand why there is this association between the security discourse strand and protection, rather than protection and the humanitarian discourse strand, we need to explore a qualitative analysis of authoritative texts. It seems clear that the realist fallacy of the natural quality of national self-interest, and the hegemonic fallacy which says that US and international interests are identical and that the world is in need of US leadership go a long way in making sense of US selfishness intertwined with cosmopolitan protection. Still, the situation emphasized by the realists – that there are decision-making systems to which the US president must cater, also seem to play their part in the selfishness. Clinton, who was personally more inclined think in cosmopolitan terms often explicitly referred to these national institutional constraints: a president has a constitutional responsibility to the nation only (Clinton, 1996a, p. 1787; Clinton, 1996x, p. 154). There, the remedy would not simply be a new way of thinking but the strengthening of representative institutions of global governance.

Many of the arguments that justify selfish motives for protection in world politics relate to the realist misunderstanding of the relationship between potentiality and actuality and assume that the actual situation proves the “realities” and the non-existence of alternative potentials. The fact that states behave selfishly is often seen as proof of the *reality* of selfishness in world politics. Thus, there is no potential for cosmopolitan thought in world politics unless it directly serves national interest⁴⁴ Thus, even the most humanitarian of missions overseas, such as the US mission to

⁴³ Falk, “‘Humanitarian Wars’, Realist Geopolitics and Genocidal Practices: ‘Saving Kosovars.’”

⁴⁴ This logic of thought is quite evident from the very beginning of classical works of realism, see for example, Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*.

promote democracy and attempt to assist Haiti in a humanitarian emergency must be realistically understood as being motivated by national interest. This is clear in Clinton's statement: "My first concern, and the most important one, obviously, is for the safety and security of our troops. General Shalikashvili and Lieutenant General Hugh Shelton, our commander in Haiti, have made it clear to all involved that the protection of American lives is our first order of business."⁴⁵ Yet, the historical context of Clinton's Haiti policy is one in which the US interests as the leader of the free world merge US power interests with the developmental interests of Haiti. This entanglement of hegemonic interests and the assumed interests of the hegemonic subjects is another discursive dynamic that deviates cosmopolitan policies towards selfish interests.

There is an American tradition of global leadership, which does naturalize selfishness, even in global governance. However, cosmopolitan protection also meets with obstacles in the institutions of decision-making. When leading the world, the US president must request funding from Congress. Constitutionally, the president must keep in mind that only the Congress can declare wars, while the legality of presidential decision-making will be monitored by an independent judiciary. Furthermore, when making decisions on security in Iraq, the US president has a mandate based not on Iraqi, but on US national and human concerns. This comes through in the US protection discourse. According to Clinton, "Every office I have ever held of the public trust, from being attorney general of my state to being governor to being president, required me to swear an oath to protect the people I was elected to serve, to give people the security they need to live up to the most of their God given potential."⁴⁶ Bush and Obama repeated the same thing, almost like a mantra. According to Bush, "[The] president's job is not to pass a 'global test.'" The president's

⁴⁵ William J. Clinton, "Remarks Prior to a Breakfast With President Jimmy Carter, General Colin Powell, and Senator Sam Nunn September 19, 1994," in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States 1994, Book 2* (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1995), 1575.

⁴⁶ William J. Clinton, "Remarks on Environmental Protection in Baltimore, Maryland August 8, 1995," in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States 1995, Book 2* (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1996), 1216.

job is to protect the American people.”⁴⁷ Obama clarified the relationship between the institutional setting and the cosmopolitan mission most accurately when he said, “As President, my greatest responsibility is to protect the American people. We are not in Afghanistan to control that country or to dictate its future. We are in Afghanistan to confront a common enemy that threatens the United States, our friends and our allies, and the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan who have suffered the most at the hands of violent extremists.”⁴⁸

This institutional commitment to realist state thinking in American foreign policy limits the US commitment to global democracy and cosmopolitanism.⁴⁹ It introduced selfish national interest in protection since the US constituencies were, in reality, not as cosmopolitan as Beck and others suggest.⁵⁰ According to Mueller, American voters would be willing to sacrifice a large number of foreigners in order to rescue a single US soldier.⁵¹

National arguments, however, cannot convince international audiences. To remedy the contradiction between internationally acceptable global humanitarian ambitions and US national interest, presidents – at least until President Trump – have tried to propose that national interests can merge with what the world needs. Thus, what is good for the United States is good for humanity. This need for consistency in speeches to domestic and international audiences pushes interpretations that put protection into a format where there is affinity between national and

⁴⁷ George W. Bush, “Remarks in Farmington Hills, Michigan October 6, 2004,” in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 2004, Book 3* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005), 2383.

⁴⁸ Barack Obama, “Remarks on United States Military and Diplomatic Strategies for Afghanistan and Pakistan March 27, 2009,” in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 2009, Book 1*. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2010), 366.

⁴⁹ Jason Ralph, “Between Cosmopolitan and American Democracy: Understanding US Opposition to the International Criminal Court,” *International Relations* 17, no. 2 (2003): 209.

⁵⁰ Beck, *Cosmopolitan Vision*.

⁵¹ John E. Mueller, “Fifteen Propositions about American Foreign Policy and Public Opinion in an Era Free of Compelling Threats.” (Prepared for presentation at the National Convention of the International Studies Association San Diego, California April 16-20, 1996, March 31, 1996), <http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/isa1996.pdf>.

international interest. If an operation protects national and international interests simultaneously, then it can be justified to the Congress and the voters as well as to the UN General Assembly. A classical American way of merging national and international interest is to claim that there is a causal relationship between global liberty and US security. George W. Bush used this tradition in his speech to soldiers: “When President Truman spoke here for the 150th anniversary of West Point, he told the class of 1952, ‘We can’t have lasting peace unless we work actively and vigorously to bring about conditions of freedom and justice in the world.’ That same principle continues to guide us in today’s war on terror. Our strategy to protect America is based on a clear premise: The security of our Nation depends on the advance of liberty in other nations. On September the 11th, 2001, we saw that problems originating in a failed and oppressive state 7,000 miles away could bring murder and destruction to our country. And we learned an important lesson: Decades of excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe. So long as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place where terrorists foment resentment and threaten American security.”⁵² While it may be so that democracies do not fight one another, the policy of enforcement of democracy has so far created enemies rather than friends for the United States, and if we look at current statistics on US conflict fatalities, it is clear that this policy has been a dominant reason for a majority of them.

Another often-used way of merging cosmopolitan and national priorities has been simply to claim that objects of US protection want what Americans want. President George W. Bush, for example, claimed that, “Most Iraqis, by far, reject violence and oppose dictatorship. In forums where Iraqis have met to discuss their political future and in all the proceedings of the Iraqi Governing Council, Iraqis have expressed clear commitments. They want strong protections for individual rights. They

⁵² George W. Bush, “Commencement Address at the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York May 27, 2006,” in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 2006, Book 1* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2007), 1039.

want their independence, and they want their freedom.”⁵³ However, Bush failed to tell his audience that according to Western polls the people the US protected in Iraq did not want that protection.⁵⁴ The nature of protective operations are often decorated with humanitarian and legal concepts that poorly describe the reality on the ground. According to President Bush’s oft-repeated claim, the US was bringing terrorists to justice. All the while, concerns could be raised that they were mostly killing people that their insufficient intelligence capacity suspected of militancy: “the best way to protect the homeland is to stay on the offense, is to keep pressure on these people. We’ve brought 75 percent of Al Qaida to justice, and we’re still working.”⁵⁵ The means the US needed to use and the outcomes of US protective actions were also often intentionally misrepresented to bring national priorities and humanitarian priorities closer to one another: “Because we acted, torture chambers are closed. Because we acted, countries like Libya understood we meant business, and they voluntarily disarmed. Because we acted, there is a democracy beginning to grow in a part of the world that needs freedom and hope. Because we acted, this man’s weapons programs will never be.”⁵⁶

Perhaps the most dangerous deceptive confusion of cosmopolitan and national interests is related to US oil interests. By decorating national interest in energy security with cosmopolitan logic, it has been possible to legitimize operations and to support regimes that in reality serve the US rather than cosmopolitan interests. The post-cold war legitimization of US energy interests has used

⁵³ George W. Bush, “The President’s News Conference April 13, 2004,” in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 2004, Book 1* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005), 557.

⁵⁴ Murtaza Hussain, “Young Iraqis Overwhelmingly Consider U.S. Their Enemy, Poll Says,” Global Research, April 15, 2016, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/young-iraqis-overwhelmingly-consider-u-s-their-enemy-poll-says/5520310>; Sean Rayment, “Secret MoD Poll: Iraqis Supports Attacks on British Troops,” *Telegraph*, October 23, 2005, <https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/168/37188.html>.

⁵⁵ George W. Bush, “Remarks in a Discussion in Portsmouth, Ohio September 10, 2004,” in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States 2004, Book 2*. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2005), 2131.

⁵⁶ George W. Bush, “Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session in Prairie Du Chien, Wisconsin May 7, 2004,” in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 2004, Book 1* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005), 811.

cosmopolitan discourse strand of protection since the very beginning of the post-cold war era. According to George H.W. Bush, “Iraq's aggression is not just a challenge to the security of our friends in the Gulf but to the new partnership of nations we're all hoping to build. Energy security is national security for us and for every country. And third: We're here to protect innocent lives, including American lives.”⁵⁷ Thus, we see a need expressed for cosmopolitan legitimacy for operations used to secure energy supplies and the need for nationalist legitimacy for operations to enforce globally beneficial norms against invasion in the Middle East.

If cosmopolitan norms are protected only when they suit the interests of the powerful, they easily become contaminated and their universal value is lost. Cosmopolitan norms in general were made suspect of being instruments of hegemonic intervention and interference. Naturally, this hinders progress in the cosmopolitanization of the world and, in part, makes the escalation of protection wars more feasible.

While selfishness in protection deviates the cosmopolitan project the approach by which national interest can become muddled with cosmopolitan humanitarian interests tends to escalate conflicts.

11 September 2001 and the contribution of “innocence”, “revenge” and “justice” to selfishness in protection

Even though the US presidential papers reveal the realist and hegemonic fallacies in the discourse strand on protection already from the beginning of the post-cold war era, it seems clear that military protection of civilians – war activities for the protection of citizens of fragile and dictatorial states – did not start immediately after the end of the cold war. On the contrary, theorists on new wars

⁵⁷ George H. W. Bush, “Remarks to the Military Airlift Command in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia November 22, 1990,” in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States 1990, Book 2* (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1991), 1667.


complain that the very reason that new wars erupted was the abandonment of fragile states by developed countries: “(T)he end of the Cold War has been accompanied by an apparently reduced willingness and ability to control internal violence ... Governments and potential insurgents no longer have ideological patrons who provide them with the wherewithal to commit violence and then expect some influence over how that violence is carried out.”⁵⁸ According to Münkler “war has become endemic mainly in regions where a major empire held sway and then fell apart.”⁵⁹ The willingness to see global civilians as important referent objects of protection, in conflicts where they could be protected, developed only slowly after the collapse of the ideological cold war rationale for intervention had disappeared.

The word frequency of the word “protection” in US presidential papers rose at the end of the 1990s and peaked during the period with the most intensive military interventionism between 2001 and 2007 (see Graph 3).

Graph 3:

⁵⁸ Donald M. Snow, *Uncivil Wars: International Security and the New Internal Conflicts* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), 46; See also Ivo H. Daalder, “The United States and Military Intervention in Internal Wars.,” in *Michael Brown, Ed., The International Dimensions of Internal Conflicts*. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), 462; Kaldor, *New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era.*, 1999, 3.

⁵⁹ Münkler, *The New Wars.*, 10.




However, protection always seemed to define US citizens as its primary referent object, and it seems that the attack on American citizens on 11 September 2001 gave this nationalist orientation some new legitimacy. As Graph 3 shows, national protection of Americans, who now were innocent victims of global threats, rose sharply after the terrorist attack on American soil.⁶⁰ The above mentioned association between protection and protective operations with the word frequency of the word “innocent” (in all its forms) in presidential papers can be specified. Innocence was not something that linked protection with humanitarian discourse strand, but simply something that became meaningful for protection when Americans themselves became the innocent victims.

Graph 4:⁶¹

⁶⁰ It would be possible to think that the increase in the frequency of “protection” in President Bush’s papers was a result of the fact that the term ‘responsibility to protect’ was introduced in the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report in late 2001. However, as Graph 4 reveals that President Bush did not refer to global civilians in his speeches on protection but was very specific about his reference to the protection of Americans. Thus, it is likely that the rise of protection discourse in 2001 was a result of the terrorist attack rather than of the global discourse on cosmopolitan protection.

⁶¹ In this graph, I have not included the environment as a referent object, but instead, I have looked at the share of these three referent objects of protection that can be protected by using military means.



As suggested by the relational coding of presidential papers in Graph 4, the situation in which the United States mainland was violated by a global force that targeted civilians and the innocence of the victims justified completely new levels of selfishness and nationalist orientations in the US global governance of security. As the change of referent object in sentences of protection suggests, the main change in the US approach took place only after the terrorist attack on 11 September 2001. This is also when interventions to protect turned much deadlier,⁶² while the previous operations in Sierra Leone (by the UK) and Kosovo were much more successful in the protection of civilians.

The unfortunate confusion in which innocent victims are seen as immune to critique, as if one can only be either a perpetrator or a victim, but not both, is not brought to light in the academic literature on cosmopolitan protection. Yet, Joseph A. Amato, from outside the study of international relations, has derived this tendency to use victimhood as a claim with a political potency that purifies and justifies, from the Christian narratives that have been used to make hardship more

⁶² Kivimäki, *Failure to Protect. The Fatal Consequences of Military Humanitarian Intervention in Conflict*.

tolerable.⁶³ While the crucified Christ has been the ultimate cultural reference, in international relations the narrative of holocaust has been the representative case of victimhood⁶⁴ that has justified Israeli policies to secure the Jewish people. The moral problems that this “purifying” victimhood poses have been dealt in academic literature,⁶⁵ just not in the cosmopolitan study of conflicts and new wars. In the Kaldorian conception of new wars, there is a conflicting party that benefits from violence and wants to continue the state of warfare as a social condition (rather than using violence instrumentally and conditional to compliance of the enemy), while the victim is simply on the receiving end of suffering.⁶⁶

The fact that innocent victimhood in political literature focusses on actors (innocent people vs. perpetrators) rather than on violent deeds has meant that the terrorist attack on the US has not sparked a reaction against terror and violence but rather against terrorists. As a result, instead of preventing violence the discourse strand on innocence has legitimized violence. Bush’s statements after the terror attack were explicit on the association between innocence and the right to act aggressively in self-interest. President Bush portrays the September 11 attack as a personal tragedy for himself, making himself a victim. Throughout the last four months of 2004, he repeats this 40 times in the presidential papers with minimal variations, always saying that after the incident of September 11, he has woken up every morning thinking of the best strategy to protect the country or its people, always emphasizing that he will be prepared to do “whatever it takes” to protect America. This, in a very concrete sense, shows the discursive path from victimhood to rough, selfish means of protection. On one of these occasions, when he explained September 11 as his personal tragedy, he experiences personal trauma due to his role as the prime protector of the

⁶³ Joseph Anthony Amato and David Monge, *Victims and Values: A History and a Theory of Suffering* (Greenwood Publishing Group, 1990).

⁶⁴ Erica Bouris, *Complex Political Victims* (Kumarian Press, 2007).

⁶⁵ Primo Levi, *The Drowned and the Saved* (Simon and Schuster, 2017); Elizabeth V. Spelman, *Fruits of Sorrow: Framing Our Attention to Suffering* (Beacon Press, 1998).

⁶⁶ Kaldor, *New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era.*, 2012, 126; Christine Chinkin and Mary Kaldor, *International Law and New Wars* (Cambridge University Press, 2017).

country: “On September the 14th, 2001, I stood in the ruins of the Twin Towers. It helped shape my thinking about my duty to protect you. I’ll never forget that day. There were workers in hardhats there yelling at me at the top of their lungs, “Whatever it takes.” I was doing my best to console those who were coming out of that rubble. They had grime and dirt all over them. I looked a guy right in the eye—he had bloodshot eyes—and he said, “Don’t let me down.” I wake up every morning since that day thinking about how to better protect America. I will never relent in doing what is necessary to secure this country and to protect you, whatever it takes.”⁶⁷ In this quotation Bush does not use the word victim; it seems that the US identity was not that of an object of aggression, but that instead, the attack had invigorated rather than made US agency passive: the US needed to get even rather than be protected by others. So, the purifying and justifying part of victimhood alone affected US foreign policy, while the objectifying part of victimhood did not. Perhaps it was the part of victimhood that creates passivity and objectivity that prevented US presidents from using the word “victim” in reference to the United States.

The path from innocent victimhood to selfishness entailed at least three steps:

1. Justification of military means over a broader territorial space. The fact that the enemy was not bound to a territory meant that self-defence covered the whole globe. George W. Bush repeated how important it was to stay on the offensive:⁶⁸ “We’re hunting the Al Qaida terrorists wherever they hide, from Pakistan to the Philippines to the Horn of Africa to

⁶⁷ George W. Bush, “Remarks in Wausau, Wisconsin October 7, 2004,” in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 2004, Book 3* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005), 2394.

⁶⁸ It would be inaccurate to claim that this language of law enforcement outside US territory was introduced by the terrorist attack in the US, and that such argumentation did not take place before that. Clinton, too, spoke of law enforcement challenges outside US border See for example, William J. Clinton, “Remarks Announcing the Appointment of Togo D. West, Jr., as Acting Secretary of Veterans Affairs and an Exchange With Reporters December 2, 1997,” in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States 1997, Book 2* (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1998), 1690., but the idea of “being on the offensive” was not a major element of the doctrine before 11 September 2001.

Iraq.”⁶⁹ The argument has its academic version in Kaldor’s cosmopolitanism in regard to the nature of new wars: “it is no longer possible to contain war geographically. Zones of peace and zones of war exist side by side in the same territorial space.”⁷⁰

2. Perceived justification of nationally motivated action. Bush mocked John Kerry for his views, according to which the US might require international acceptance for its global operations. “When my opponent first ran for Congress, he argued that American troops should be deployed only at the directive of the United Nations ... Over the years, Senator Kerry has looked for every excuse to constrain America’s action in the world.”⁷¹
3. Perceived justification of US violations of agreed universal norms and laws on warfare and torture: “Treaties make no sense. There’s only one thing: get them before they get us, to stay on the offensive.”⁷²

All these effects of innocence on a US understanding of protection in world politics diverted an idea that had started as cosmopolitan protection in a direction where selfish interests, rather than humanitarian considerations, dictated policies. The association between the threat discourse strand and the protection discourse strand in Graph 1 and the rise of the US as a referent agent of protection in protection speech (Graph 3) is partly explained by the entanglement of the protection discourse strand with the innocence discourse strand after the terrorist incident on 11 September 2001.

⁶⁹ George W. Bush, “Remarks at Pease Air National Guard Base in Portsmouth, New Hampshire October 9, 2003,” in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 2003, Book 1*. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2004), 1277.

⁷⁰ Kaldor, *New and Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era.*, 2012, 185.

⁷¹ Bush, “Remarks in Wausau, Wisconsin October 7, 2004,” 2392.

⁷² George W. Bush, “Remarks at a Luncheon for Gubernatorial Candidate Haley Barbour in Jackson, Mississippi September 12, 2003,” in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States 2003, Book 2* (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 2004), 1149.

11 September 2001 and the contribution of “law enforcement” to selfishness in protection

In addition to the discursive entanglement with victimhood, the debate on protection was also entangled with the debate on crime and law enforcement after the terrorist attack on the US.

Americans had been victims of criminal violence in their own country before, but now victimhood entered into international security and gave the US a new identity as an innocent and actively revengeful victim of criminal international terrorism, within their own country. Previously, US safety from crime and domestic acts of terror could be separated from the defence effort that was aided by the presence of oceans protecting US external security. According to Bush: “In our country it used to be that oceans could protect us September the 11th, that changed. America is now a battleground in the war on terror.”⁷³ This interpretation of the September 11 incident created an entanglement of the crime and terror discourse strands: the heroes protecting Americans from violence, who once came exclusively from the national police forces, were now defending Americans against international terrorism. Consequently, the rules of crime prevention were exported to the world of global protection against terror.

The discourse strands on crime and terror employed a somewhat similar logic already in the 1990s, as crime was prevented without dialogue with criminals by strengthening the rule of law.⁷⁴

Interaction with criminals would have articulated social realities in which the existence of the rule of law would have been questionable, and thus, action was based on enforcement of the law.

Intelligence by surveillance shifted focus from potential enemies (unfriendly countries) to potential criminals (terrorists AND ordinary citizens), and militarized means of law enforcement spread from

⁷³ George W. Bush, “Remarks Following Discussions With Prime Minister John Howard of Australia and an Exchange With Reporters February 10, 2003,” in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 2003, Book 1*. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2004), 152.

⁷⁴ for the same logic in the terrorism discourse strand, see George W. Bush, “Remarks in a Discussion at Mid-States Aluminum Corporation in Fond Du Lac, Wisconsin July 14, 2004,” in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States 2004, Book 2*. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2005), 1317.

military operations in enemy territories into domestic crowd control. The Patriot Act of 2001 merged the worlds of the intelligence community and law enforcement and allowed intelligence sharing, moving the use of CIA/NSA intelligence into courtrooms in order to prevent terrorism.⁷⁵ The creation of the Department of Homeland Security on 25 November 2002 merged the bureaucracies of crime prevention and prevention of international terrorism, making international protection from terrorism a national priority and making a national agency responsible.


In the international protection discourse strand, the national priorities and agency can be seen in Graphs 1 and 3. The new priority of terror in the discourse can be seen in presidential papers (see Graph 4) as well as in the subsequent tripling of resources for terror prevention during the first two years after 11 September 2001⁷⁶ as well as in the new mandates received by various domestic institutions (law enforcement and more) in the Homeland Security Presidential Directives and the sharper focus on the national priority of terror prevention.⁷⁷ Graph 4 also reveals that the role of the terrorism discourse strand in US national governance was relatively similar to that held by the law enforcement discourse strand, since the rise of the terrorism discourse abolished the need for the dominance of the crime prevention discourse.

Graph 4:

⁷⁵ US Department of Justice, “The USA PATRIOT Act: Preserving Life and Liberty,” 2001, <https://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/highlights.htm>.

⁷⁶ George W. Bush, “Remarks to the United States Conference of Mayors January 23, 2004,” in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 2004, Book 1* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005), 116.

⁷⁷ See, for example, George W. Bush, “Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD–9—Defense of United States Agriculture and Food January 30, 2004,” in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 2004, Book 1* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005), 173–77.



Since crime prevention was mainly a national issue (with the exception of international crime – a rarer problem), it was understandable that the discursive strand was national: there was no need for UN acceptance to employ measures to prevent national crime,⁷⁸ even though – after 11 September – the criminal resided outside the US. The objectives of such prevention were thus national, and so were the institutions. While the entanglement of crime and terror discourses resulted from a non-discursive event on September 11 (this event, however, became real and meaningful in the interpretations embedded in existing discourses), the discourse gave rise to material and institutional changes in resourcing and legal and institutional facilitation of nationalist global policy to protect the world from terrorism. The discourse of protection of people from criminal terror spoke through the new officials in their roles as global law enforcers, allowing them agency for the further transformation of protection, but within a set of rules and expectations that their new institutional and legal framework allowed and the discourse strand on protection motivated. The idea of global law enforcement also moved from the debate on national crime onto the international scene, thus legitimizing individual punishment by the US of terrorists in sovereign

⁷⁸ Bush, “Remarks in Wausau, Wisconsin October 7, 2004,” 2392.

countries that were not necessarily hostile to the US, and that had little say on US law enforcement within their territory. Drone warfare seems the clearest consequence of the discursive entanglement of the terror and protection discourse strand with that on crime. Nationalistically motivated and authorized global law enforcement was added to the toolbox of US “cosmopolitan protection,” despite that fact that, in the international setting, legitimate legal norms were far less clear. Again, the right of the US to enforce its law and its interpretation of international law was not shared by the people of the areas where this law enforcement was conducted. As a result, conflicts escalated and the people cosmopolitan protection was supposed to shield died as a result of the protection.

Conclusion

The interaction between material, institutional and discursive realities and the actions of purposeful politicians and voters is a circle with no beginning or an end. Yet, if we try to understand the emergence of the originally cosmopolitan protection debate in post-cold war US and Western foreign policies, we will have to take certain historically generated social institutional and material realities as the point of departure. For presidents who wanted to protect civilians in Rwanda, Somalia, or Bosnia, the institutional point of departure was determined by the necessity of getting their resources and legal framework of operations from the nation’s elected legislators and their mandate from the nation’s voters. As suggested by Falk (2003), and empirically shown in this article, this was difficult.

This institutional setting interacted with the realist debate, even though realism assumed that instead of the socio-historical constitution of this changeable reality, national primacy was the natural way. The strategy of combining international and national interests so that the US could justify its global operations both in Congress and in the UN propelled the official rhetoric (which often primarily needed to convince national rather than international constituencies) towards interpretations that emphasized that global and national interests were identical.

Entanglements with national debates on the military and law enforcement directed the protection discourse strand in a direction that was even more problematic. If US power was necessary for the humanitarian order of the world, then US global law enforcement and retribution of its victimhood was acceptable. Since no citizens of a sovereign nation can accept law enforcement from afar on their own territory, especially from a nation that does not subject itself to many of the existing global norms, protection mixed with selfish nationalistic norms escalated rather than reduced violence in the world. Thus, a tracing of the discourse strand on protection by means of textual and discourse analysis reveals a partial explanation for the fact that US interventions have tended to contribute to the increase of conflict fatalities and state fragility.

The confusion of realist and neo-realist ideas with cosmopolitan ones has been possible partly due to the sloppiness of the cosmopolitan theory and the theory of new wars on the question of who is the legitimate agent of protection. If the normative regime on cosmopolitan protection had been clear on the question of agency, if it had insisted on the democratic principle that people and their values can only be protected by institutions that represent these people, it would have been more difficult for nations to mix selfish interests with operations that claim cosmopolitan legitimacy. The agency of protection and the agency of defining who to protect and what values to protect, point up a dangerous blind spot in cosmopolitan thinking of many theorists of international relations. This blind spot allows selfish nationalism to creep into the implementation of cosmopolitan protection. If we pay no attention to agency, we will see no problem in agents getting their resources and their mandate from national constituencies that determine who to protect, how to protect and which values to protect. This exposes cosmopolitan protection to mixing up national and global interests, even if “the politics of human has become the civil religion, the faith of the United States itself.” Thus, even if US enforcement of cosmopolitan norms is not purely an enforcement of selfish interests, as Beck suggests,⁷⁹ it is still an enforcement of the global norms tarnished by the

⁷⁹ Beck, *Cosmopolitan Vision*, 137.

selfish national interests of those who enforce such norms. The idea of democracy and the Kantian version of cosmopolitanism⁸⁰ that commits to the general contours of the social contract tradition, advises us against forgetting the agency of politics or protection. Only ownership of the norms and their enforcement by the objects of such enforcement allows cosmopolitan norms their legitimacy amongst the people upon which such norms are being enforced. Without legitimacy, the enforcement of cosmopolitan values and the protection of civilians will have to focus on the destruction of disagreement with what we may view as cosmopolitanism, but what they view as colonialism and imperialism. This escalates rather than alleviates violence, as we have seen in the protection wars of the new millennium.

To remedy this, cosmopolitanism needs to turn from its focus on civil society and take representative institutions seriously. It is undoubtedly true that cosmopolitan ethics and motives for cosmopolitan politics arise from the emerging global solidarity among global citizens. It is undoubtedly a product of the emergence of a global civil society, rather than state-centric development. Yet, just as functionalist integration could not ignore the need for authoritative decisions made by representative institutions, the enforcement of cosmopolitan peace will require authoritative decisions that can only be made by representative institutions. Successful enforcement of a set of principles will necessarily require authoritative decisions on the principles, on the way in which they are enforced, and by whom. Thus, we cannot simply rely on the type of improvised governance that the popular revolt against communist dictatorships in Eastern Europe represented. A change from functionalist integration studies to neo-functional integration studies was needed there. We will need a change from cosmopolitan to neo-cosmopolitan theory. This would take the question of agency seriously, recognizing that building a global order requires representation and new types of representative institutions. The problem with representation is especially urgent in the

⁸⁰ Immanuel Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals*, ed. M. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

third world, where most cosmopolitan humanitarian interventions have taken place and where popular representation is less developed. Until third world people can participate in the cosmopolitan process, the cosmopolitan West will be found to be fighting imperial wars rather than making humanitarian interventions. It may even be that until national representative institutions in the third world, institutions enabling participation in global dialogue are consolidated, we cannot expect these peoples' participation and active engagement in the dialogue for creation of a truly globally-owned cosmopolitan consensus.

Part of the problem of cosmopolitan protection of civilians may be related to the theoretical blind spots of cosmopolitan thinking. However, most of the problems must be attributed to the practice of political cosmopolitanism or the selfish nationalism of the powers that pretend to enforce a cosmopolitan order. The practice of political cosmopolitanism must stop ignoring existing international institutions such as the United Nations, the International Criminal Court, arms control regimes and so on. Assuming that powerful states have the right to enforce norms that they do not apply to themselves is a non-sequitur. Enforcing rules on war crimes without taking part in the international normative order that can condemn one's own soldiers for these, enforcing arms control norms with which one is not ready to comply and making decisions to refer state leaders to international courts that one's own country does not submit to, is a hypocrisy that no amount of cyber control or information warfare can hide.